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Abstract
The moral of Buridan's Ass is that it can sometimes be rational to perform one
action rather than another even though one lacks stronger reason to do so. Yet it
is also commonly believed that it cannot ever be rational to believe one proposition
rather than another if one lacks stronger reason to do so. This asymmetry has been
taken to indicate a deep dierence between epistemic and practical rationality.
According to the view articulated here, the asymmetry should instead be explained
by the dierence between rational intentions and rational actions. Thus, it turns
out, Buridan's Ass-style cases do not indicate an asymmetry between epistemic and
practical rationality as such.
1. Introduction
A hungry ass is halfway between two indistinguishable bundles of hay. The consensus
among philosophers is that it would be rational for the ass to go to either bundle. The
moral of the story is that the following principle is false:
Action Sucient Reason (ASR): It is practically rational to  rather
than  only if there are stronger practical reasons to  than to  .
However, suppose the ass is wondering which bundle has more hay (and suppose the ass
knows they are not equally sized). Since the ass has no reason to think either bundle has
more hay, the consensus among philosophers is that it would not be rational for the ass
to believe that either bundle has more hay. The moral of this story is that the following
principle is true:
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2Belief Sucient Reason* (BSR*): It is epistemically rational to believe
P rather than Q only if there are stronger epistemic reasons to believe P
than to believe Q.1
So there appears to be an asymmetry between reasons in the practical and the epis-
temic realm. What gives? Gilbert Harman takes this asymmetry to be an \important
dierence" (Harman 1999: 14) between theoretical and practical reasoning. Pamela Hi-
eronymi claims it shows that \practical reasoning is not governed by the same principles
as theoretical reasoning," but gives no further explanation of this dierence (Hieronymi
2009: 208). Similarly, Ruth Weintraub claims that epistemic rationality diers from
practical rationality in enjoining us to \forgo an option which is at least as good as any
other" but does not go on to explain why epistemic rationality diers from practical
rationality in this way (Weintraub 2012: 298).
Rather than attempting to explain the purported asymmetry, we think we should
deny it exists. So, in this paper we develop an account { the Parity Account { according to
which there is no asymmetry between practical and epistemic rationality in this respect,
i.e., in cases where reasons for two incompatible options are equally strong. The plan for
the paper is this: In the next section (x2), we lay out the Parity Account and explain
its components. Next (x3), we oer an independent argument in favor of the major
component of the Parity Account. We then consider and reply to an objection to the
Parity Account (x4). In the nal three sections (xx5-7) we consider whether accepting the
Parity Account leaves us with any remaining, unresolved asymmetries. The upshot of the
paper is that one important reason for thinking that the requirements of practical and
epistemic rationality are asymmetrical (i.e., Buridan's Ass-style cases) is not compelling.
This is an important result for, insofar as we are interested in a unied, systematic
account of the nature of reasons and rationality, an account that allows for symmetry
between the practical and epistemic domains should be preferred to one that introduces
an unexplained asymmetry.
A brief clarication about the scope of our argument before we start. We're interested,
here, in arguing against an asymmetry in the requirements of rationality when it comes
to cases such as Buridan's Ass. Our account, which includes no asymmetry is obviously
preferable to accounts { such as those mentioned above { that include an unexplained
asymmetry between practical and epistemic rationality in this regard. Here, although
we'll present independent reasoning in favor of adopting a symmetrical account such as
the one we oer here, we won't directly argue that our view is preferable to accounts
that include and explain an asymmetry between practical and epistemic rationality with
respect of cases like Buridan's Ass. Hence, strictly speaking, we leave open the question
whether our account is preferable to, for instance, an account of practical and epistemic
1The asterisk indicates that this principle will shortly be modied to take account of the fact that
beliefs come in degrees (see x2).
3rationality according to which practical and epistemic rationality enjoy some (explained
yet) fundamental asymmetry in this regard.2
2. The Symmetry Between Practical and Epistemic Rationality
In contrast to Harman, Heironymi and Weintraub, the account developed here defends
the claim that there is no asymmetry between practical and epistemic rationality in
cases such as Buridan's Ass. Briey put, the idea is that when the comparison between
practical and epistemic decisions is made at the appropriate level, we see that the alleged
asymmetry between the practical and the epistemic is only apparent. We can call this
the Parity Account. The account has three separate but related components. In
this section, we discuss these components; in subsequent sections, we address objections
aimed at each component.
The rst component of the Parity Account is that the proper practical analog of
belief is not action, but intention. Call this the Belief-Intention Analogy. There
are two motivations for the Belief-Intention Analogy: First, note that just as beliefs are
the mental states that agents (when functioning properly) reason in accordance with,
intentions are the mental state that agents (when functioning properly) act in accordance
with. Beliefs and intentions are the mental backdrop against which agents reason and
act, respectively. Second, beliefs and intentions both have content, whereas actions do
not { beliefs and intentions are about something while actions are not in the relevant
sense about anything. Both beliefs and intentions are, while actions are not, contentful
mental states. This strongly suggests that just as the norms of epistemic rationality
governs belief in the rst instance, the norms of practical rationality govern intentions
in the rst instance.3;4
The second component of the Parity Account is that both beliefs and intentions come
in degrees; that is, both are gradable states. Call this the Gradability Thesis. In the
case of belief, this thesis is familiar and widely accepted: agents' doxastic states can be
described in terms of their degrees of belief, i.e. credences, and these are widely assumed
to be governed by probabilistic norms of rationality.5 Of course, it is often convenient
to describe agents as believing propositions simpliciter (as opposed to having particular
degrees of belief in propositions), but on the current view this should not be taken to
indicate that there is some further doxastic attitude { belief simpliciter { that God would
have had to create once she had endowed all agents with degrees of belief. Rather, the
2Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging clarity on this point.
3See Shah (2003, 2008) for a dierent route to this same idea, that belief and intention are what the
norms of epistemic and practical rationality govern, respectively.
4We don't mean to suggest that actions are not governed by practical norms at all, or that the
label `practical' applies only to norms governing intention, not also those governing actions. Indeed, we
discuss (practical) norms for action in detail below (see especially the end of this section, and xx6-7).
5See, e.g., Kyburg (1961), Jerey (1973), Christensen (2004).
4folk concept of belief simpliciter simply denotes contextually-determined sets of degrees
of belief { usually if not always to a degree of belief above some contextually-determined
threshold.6
Taking account of this point, we can restate BSR* { the principle that says it's
irrational to believe on the basis of insucient reason { in a way that applies to graded
belief:
Belief Sucient Reason (BSR): It is epistemically rational to have a
higher degree of belief in P than in Q only if there are stronger epistemic
reasons to believe P than to believe Q.
BSR says that rationality in (degree of) belief requires support by sucient reason: one
can't rationally have a higher degree of belief in P than in Q unless the reasons in favor
of thinking P is the case are stronger than the reasons in favor of thinking Q is. For
our ass, who has no reasons to believe that either of the two bundles has more hay, BSR
yields the result that the ass's degree of belief that the left bundle has more hay should
match the ass's degree of belief that the right bundle has more hay.
A clarication: BSR imposes a restriction on the rationality of having a higher degree
of belief in some proposition P than another proposition Q. It says that this should only
occur when there are stronger reasons to believe P than Q. This implies that when the
reasons for believing P and Q are equally strong, one should not have a higher degree
of belief in P than in Q. This in turn implies that, if one has any degrees of belief in
both P and Q at all, then these should be equally strong. Notice, however, that BSR is
compatible with an agent lacking any degree of belief in either or both of P and Q. Thus,
for example, BSR does not tell us anything about the rationality of having a degree of
belief in P but lacking any degree of belief in Q when there are equally strong reasons
to believe each proposition.7
So far we have noted that belief is a gradable state. That intention is a gradable state
is less familiar thesis and, correspondingly, it is a less widely accepted idea. However,
once the possibility of gradable intention is raised, it is hard to deny. This is so for
at least two reasons: First, the thesis is intuitively plausible as a description of our
mental life since we do distinguish between our stronger and weaker intentions. For
6See, e.g., Foley (1992), Weatherson (2005), Ganson (2008), Sturgeon (2008).
7But, see x6 below for further discussion. We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to
our attention. Admittedly, there is an issue here about what it is to lack any degree of belief at all in
some proposition. We are inclined towards the view that to lack any degree of belief at all is to have a
completely mushy or indeterminate degree of belief that stretches over the entire unit interval, i.e. [0,1],
instead of being a specic point on that interval (see, e.g., Levi 1974; van Fraassen 1990; Joyce 2010;
Moss 2015). One nice thing about this kind of picture is that it allows for the extent to which you have
a degree of belief in a proposition to be a matter of degree as well: it will depend on how mushy your
degree of belief is, where \how mushy" is determined by how large the interval is that describes your
degree of belief (a larger interval corresponds to a mushier degree of belief, with the limits being (a) the
entire unit interval [0,1] and (b) a specic point on that interval, e.g. 0.7. But, for all we say here, it
may be that some alternative picture of what it is to lack any degree of belief at all is preferable.
5example, a father may have a very strong intention to buy his daughter a birthday
present, a somewhat weaker intention to buy his daughter a book for her birthday, and
a yet weaker intention to buy her a book about Winnie-the-Pooh. The most natural and
plausible way of modelling these variations is by taking intention, like belief, to be an
inherently gradable type of state.8
Second, the gradability of intention is needed to avoid analogs of the preface paradox
for rational intention.9 A non-gradable conception of intention yields counterintuitive
results according to which combinations of seemingly rational intentions cannot count
as rational. For instance, borrowing from Goldstein (2016): Susan may strongly intend
to visit each of 20 dierent cathedrals on her trip to Europe, and she may also strongly
intend to skip visiting one of them (since she can only aord the entrance fee for 19
cathedrals). If we take Susan's intentions to be non-gradable, her intentions count as
mutually inconsistent and thus irrational. On a gradable conception of intention, by
contrast, there is no necessary inconsistency since a strong intention to perform each of
20 actions is compatible with a strong intention not to perform all of them. The upshot
is that these preface-like paradoxes are eortlessly resolved in much the same way that
a gradable conception of belief solves the preface paradox.10
Some might nd these motivations for accepting the Gradability Thesis about inten-
tion insucient. Here, our aim is not to argue for the Gradability Thesis about either
belief or intention. Instead, we provide these cases as motivation for accepting that view,
at least for the sake of argument. We aim to show what work the view can do for us, if
we accept it. Readers uncomfortable with the suggestion that intention, like belief, is a
gradable state are invited to read the following arguments conditionally: if we accept the
Gradability Thesis about both belief and intention, then we can dissolve the apparent
asymmetry between practical and epistemic rationality.
Now, with the Belief-Intention Analogy and the Gradability Thesis about belief and
intention in place, the third component of the Parity Account is that, as with belief,
rationality in intending to do one thing more strongly than another requires the presence
8Bratman (1987) has suggested, if perhaps only indirectly, that cases of this sort can be redescribed
as involving either (full) intentions or `endeavorings,' an intention-like state that amounts to having a
\guiding desire" to perform the action. Bratman's suggestion is arguably problematic in that it posits
two distinct kinds of intention-like states, thus failing to unify the dierent guises of intention (McCann
1991). More importantly for our purposes, this move clearly will not work in this case since there are
three dierent types of intention-like states in this case, and Bratman has provided us only with two
(i.e. intentions and endeavorings). (See also Holton (2008) and Shpall (2016) for additional arguments
that Bratman's move (and other similar moves) will not work in general.)
9For the classic statement of the preface paradox in the case of belief, see Makinson (1965).
10For two recent arguments for the idea that intentions come in degree that appeal to analogs of the
preface paradox, see Goldstein (2016) and Schpall (2016). Holton (2008) similarly argues that intentions
can be partial, though he suggests they would not be gradable in the same way as degrees of belief.
It's also worth noting that Bratman (1987) discusses \partial intentions," but he means something very
dierent by this than what we (and Goldstein, Holton, and Schpall) mean here. Interestingly, Goldstein
(2016) argues that Bratman's conception of intention implies that there must be partial intentions in
the sense we intend.
6of stronger reasons to intend to do that rst thing. More precisely:
Intention Sucient Reason (ISR): It is practically rational to have a
higher degree of intention to  than to  only if there are stronger practical
reasons to intend to  than to intend to  .
For our ass, ISR yields the result that the ass's degree of intention to go to the left
bundle should match the ass's degree of intention to go to the right bundle. In eect,
then, the ass should be, with respect to its degrees of intention regarding the left and
right bundles, in equipoise: after all, the ass has neither more reason to intend to go left
than right, nor more reason to intend to go right than left. Note, however, that it does
not follow that the ass should be, with respect to all its bundle-involving intentions, in
equipoise. After all, we've said that the ass is hungry and wants to eat hay: so, the
ass will have a very high degree of intention to go to either the right bundle or the
left bundle and a correspondingly very low degree of intention to go to neither bundle.
Since the ass, by hypothesis, has much stronger practical reasons to go to either bundle
than it does to go to neither bundle, ISR happily permits the ass to form a very strong
intention to go to either bundle.
As in the case of belief, a clarication is in order. ISR imposes a restriction on the
rationality of having a higher degree of intention to  than to  ; it says that this should
only occur when there are stronger reasons to intend to  than to  . This implies that
when the reasons for intending to  and  are equally strong, one should not have a
higher degree of intention to  than to  . This in turn implies that, if one has degrees of
intentions to  and  at all, then they should be equally strong. Notice, however, that
ISR is compatible with an agent lacking any degree of intention with regards to either
or both of -ing and  -ing. Thus, for example, ISR does not tell us anything about the
rationality of having a degree of intention to  but lacking any degree of intention with
respect to  -ing when there are equally strong reasons to intend each action.11
So the Parity Account holds, rst, that epistemic and practical rationality govern
belief and intention respectively (the Belief-Intention Analogy); second, that belief and
intention are both gradable mental states (the Gradability Thesis); and third, that prac-
tical rationality requires that one has stronger intentions for one action rather than
another only if one has stronger practical reasons for intending the former than one has
for intending the latter (Intention Sucient Reason, ISR). This dissolves the apparent
asymmetry between practical and epistemic rationality with respect to Buridan's Ass
since structurally identical principles { viz. ISR and BSR { govern the practical re-
sponse it is rational for the ass to have (in terms of its intentions) and the epistemic
response it is rational for the ass to have (in terms of its beliefs). The idea, then, is that
11Again, as in the case of belief, there is an issue here about what it is to lack any degree of intention
at all to perform an action. We are inclined towards a view that treats such cases symmetrically to the
case of lacking a credence, but the details of such an account would take us too far aeld.
7once the comparison is made at the appropriate level { in terms of graded intention and
graded belief { there simply isn't any dierence between what it's rational for the ass
to do when the (practical or epistemic) reasons in favor of two alternatives are equally
strong. When the practical reasons in favor of two courses of action are equally strong,
it is irrational to intend to perform one of them more strongly than the other. And when
the epistemic reasons in favor of two propositions are equally strong, it is irrational to
believe one of them more strongly than the other.12
One might wonder how actions enter this picture. After all, there is clearly some
relationship between rational actions and rational intentions. Although nothing about
the Parity Account commits it to any particular view about that relationship, it seems
clear what a proponent of the Parity Account should say about this relationship, viz.
that in order for it to be rational to intentionally perform some action  rather than
intentionally perform some alternative action  , it must be rational to have a greater
or equal degree of intention to  as to  . In the case of Buridan's Ass, this condition
is met: by ISR, it is not irrational to have the same degree of intention to  as it is to
 . So, were the ass to intentionally go to the left bundle, its action would be rational
according to ISR; the same can be said were it to go to the right bundle.
The upshot is this: if the Parity Account is correct, what's required for it to be
rational for the ass to actually go to (say) the left bundle rather than the right is not
that it's rational for the ass to intend to a greater degree to to the left bundle rather
than the right. All that's necessary is that it be rational for the ass to have a greater
or the same degree of intention to go to the left bundle as the right. Thus it can be
rational to perform some action even if there is no overall practical reason to perform
that action rather than some other action, despite the fact that rationally intending to
a greater degree to perform some action requires that it be rational to have an overall
practical reason to perform that action.13
3. Independent Support for ISR
The Parity Account, as we've just seen, dissolves the apparent asymmetry between epis-
temic and practical rationality. ISR is crucial to its ability to do so: it's because intentions
to perform one action rather than another shouldn't be arbitrarily strong that, in cases
such as Buridan's Ass, the epistemic and practical responses it's rational for the ass to
12Here and in what follows, we use \S intends X more strongly than Y" and \S believes X more
strongly than Y" as shorthands for \S's degree of intention to X is higher than S's degree of intention
to Y" and \S's degree of belief in X is higher than S's degree of belief in Y". For stylistic reasons, we
also freely move between other locutions involving these and other cognate terms. For instance: we will
sometimes refer to the \strength" and sometimes to the \degree" of an agent's intentions and beliefs.
13The point here is related to the idea that, in practical cases, it can sometimes be rational to \plump"
for one action or another. For a nice discussion of this phenomenon, see Blackburn (2012). What the
Parity Account insists on is that, while it can be rational to plump for one action over another, it isn't
rational to plump for having a stronger intention to perform one action rather than another.
8have are, mutatis mutandis, the same. So, one reason for accepting ISR is that it helps us
dissolve what would otherwise be a puzzling, unexplained asymmetry between epistemic
and practical rationality. But is there any independent reason { that is, independent
from its use in this argument { for accepting ISR? Yes: alternatives to ISR, principles
that allow for intentions to be arbitrarily strong, all deliver problematic results in a range
of cases. Let us explain.
Suppose some alternative to ISR is true. Then there will be cases where, without
exhibiting any irrationality, an agent more strongly intends to  than she intends to
 , even when the reasons in favor of intending to  and intending to  are equally
strong. (Since this is precisely what ISR denies, any alternative to ISR must allow for
this possibility.) Perhaps the ass is supposed to be a case in point: we can imagine
that the ass more strongly intends to go to the left bundle than the right bundle, despite
lacking a reason that more strongly favors intending to go left than intending to go right.
According to the current idea, there is nothing irrational about doing so.
The problem with this proposal becomes clear if we imagine what happens, in a
scenario such as the one we're considering, if the ass were to learn that the right bundle
contains one more straw of hay than the left bundle. That fact is, by hypothesis, a reason
for the ass to increase the degree of its intention to go right rather than left (or, what
amounts to the same thing, a reason to decrease the degree of its intention to go left
rather than right). Even the proponent of some alternative to ISR, who thinks it's not
irrational to arbitrarily have a stronger intention to do one thing rather than another,
should admit that failing to respond to this reason in this way would itself be irrational,
so let's suppose the ass does respond to it, either by increasing the degree of its intention
to go right rather than left, or by decreasing the degree of its intention to go left rather
than right. What is the result?
The desired result, the result we can all agree would be the rational result in terms of
the ass's intentions, is that the ass now more strongly intends to go right than left. After
all, the ass just learned that the right bundle has more hay in it, and, by hypothesis, the
ass wants as much hay as possible. But if the proposal we're considering here is correct,
this result does not follow. For notice that if any alternative to ISR is correct, there is
no reason the ass, even after increasing its degree of intention to go right, would not end
up in a state in which it still has a stronger intention to go left, or a state in which its
intentions to go left and to go right are equally strong. Of course, whether this sort of
case materializes will depend on how much stronger the intention to go left was initially,
and how strong a reason for going right is provided by the information that the right
bundle contains slightly more hay. However, the point remains that no alternative to
ISR will guarantee that gaining a practical reason to intend to  rather than intend to,
in a situation where you had no such reasons before, will make it rational to to have a
stronger intention to  than  .
9So, independently of its use by the Parity Account in dissolving the asymmetry in
Buridan's Ass style cases, ISR is made plausible by the fact that it guarantees that
gaining a reason to  rather than  `tips the balance' in favor of -ing if the scales were
equally balanced before. However, one might think that ISR isn't the only principle that
guarantees this. In particular, consider a principle such as:
Stronger Reason (SR): If agent A has stronger reason to intend to  than
to intend to  , then it would be irrational for A to both intend to some degree
to  and also intend to some equal or greater degree to  .
If true, SR would explain why, in the sorts of cases outlined above, it would be irrational
for the ass to end up in a state where its intention to go left and its intention to go right
are equally strong, and it would do so without appeal to ISR. So, it might appear that
ISR is otiose, and opponents of it can simply accept SR, which is plausible in its own
right, and go on to reject ISR, while continuing to deliver the required result.14
However, there are at least two problems with this response. First, supposing that
SR is true, we can ask what explains why it is true. And, we suggest, the most plausible
explanation of SR is provided by:
Reason-Intention-Proportionality (RIP): If an agent A intends to ,
A's degree of intention to  should (on pain of irrationality) be proportional
to the strength of A's reasons for intending to .
RIP is very plausible on its own. (So, too, is the corresponding principle for belief,
which claims that an agent's degree of belief in a proposition P , if she has one, should
be proportional to the strength of her epistemic reasons to believe P .) Moreover, RIP
explains why SR is true in an elegant way: Why is it irrational, given stronger reasons
to intend to , to have an equally strong or even stronger intention to  ? Because
the strength of one's intentions ought to be spread across actions proportional to the
strength of the reasons there are for those intentions. But notice that the opponent of
ISR cannot appeal to RIP in order to explain SR. For note that RIP does not just entail
SR, it also entails ISR. So, while we're happy to accept SR, doing so won't do away
with the argument for ISR, since the best explanation of why SR is true appeals to a
principle, viz. RIP, which itself entails ISR.
A second problem with using SR to handle the cases discussed above while reject-
ing ISR emerges when we consider how degrees of intention should rationally change
when one gains reasons for or against intending something. Consider the following very
plausible principle:
Reason-Intention-Gain (RIG): If agent A gains a reason to intend to
 (and gains no other reasons), then A should (on pain of irrationality)
14Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting SR as an alternative explanation of the cases.
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increase her degree of intention to  (unless A's degree of intention was
already maximal, in which case it should stay maximal).15
Anyone who accepts SR but rejects ISR will have to deny RIG. To see why, consider an
agent A who, at t1, has equally strong reasons to intend to  as she has to intend to  ,
and yet intends to  more strongly than she intends to  (in violation of ISR but not
SR). Now suppose that, at a later time t2, A gains a reason to intend to  (but does not
gain a reason to intend to  ) and so, by the lights of SR, all that's required is that A
should continue to intend to  more strongly than she intends to  . Indeed, for all SR
tells us, we can suppose that the rationally required state of comparative intentions at t2
is exactly the same as the state she was in before, i.e. at t1. In that case, A would have
gained a reason to intend to  (and no other reason), and yet according to someone who
accept SR but rejects ISR, A should not increase her degree of intention to . This is so
despite the fact that, as we've described the case, it's possible that the original intention
to  is not maximal. Hence a proponent of SR who rejects ISR must also reject RIG.
And, again, that seems to be the wrong result.
4. The Intentional Action Objection
We've just seen an argument against alternatives to ISR (and so in favor of ISR itself) to
the eect that those alternatives deliver unacceptable results in terms of the rationality of
particular intentions. But it might appear that accepting ISR has its own unacceptable
results. In particular, it might appear that accepting ISR delivers unacceptable results
regarding the rationality of particular intentional actions. We'll call this the Intentional
Action Objection to ISR.
The objection starts with what is perhaps a natural principle connecting intentions
and intentional actions:
Stronger Intention Principle (SIP): If one s intentionally at some time
t, then at t the degree of one's intention to  is necessarily higher than the
degree of each of one's competing intentions at t, where competing intentions
are other intentions that cannot by one's own lights be executed simultane-
ously.
For example, if an agent raises her hand intentionally at 1:15pm, then at 1:15pm the
agent's intention to raise her hand is stronger than each of her competing intentions at
1:15pm, e.g. to shake her hand or to keep it where it was. The objection proceeds: it
15Note that even those who accept the possibility of attitudes that are insensitive to what Caspar Hare
(2010) calls \mild sweetening" should not reject RIG, since by hypothesis mild sweetening-insensitive
attitudes are not ipso facto irrational, and so the agent is not failing to respond to a reason she has if
she fails to increase the degree of the attitude in the face of the sweetening.
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certainly does not seem irrational for the ass to intentionally go to the left bundle at
some particular time t. (Indeed, we've already granted this claim.) Thus, given SIP,
the ass's intention to go to the left bundle at t must be stronger than than each of the
ass's competing intentions at t. Now, ISR says that it would be irrational for the ass's
intention to go to the left bundle to be stronger than each of the ass's intentions at t, and
in particular that it would be irrational for the ass's intention to go to the left bundle
to be stronger at t than the ass's intention to go to the right bundle. But then ISR says
that the ass is necessarily subject to some irrationality: after all, the ass will (if SIP is
correct) necessarily intend to a greater degree to go to the left bundle at t than it will
intend to go to the right bundle at t, and doing so is (according to ISR) irrational. Hence
ISR must be mistaken, since it involves agents in unavoidable irrationality in cases such
as Buridan's Ass.
The correct response to this objection is to reject the principle connecting intention
and intentional action, i.e., to reject SIP. It's not true that if one s intentionally at some
time t, then at t, one's intention to  is stronger than each of one's other intentions at t.
A simple counterexample shows this: An agent can simultaneously intend to nish her
book manuscript to a very high degree, intend to nish watching the last season of The
Wire to a somewhat lower degree, and intentionally do the latter rather than the former
(perhaps through weakness of will). To put the point dierently, SIP wrongly entails
that if an agent has a stronger intention to nish her book manuscript than to watch
The Wire tonight, then her watching of the The Wire could not be something she does
intentionally.16
So SIP is subject to straightforward counterexamples. Why, then, might it seem so
plausible at rst sight? The answer, we submit, is that SIP is easily confused with a true
principle in its vicinity, namely:
Stronger Motivation Principle (SMP): If one s intentionally at some
time t, then at t the degree of one's motivation to  is necessarily higher than
the degree of each of one's competing motivations at t, where competing
motivations are motivations to perform actions that cannot be performed
simultaneously.
SMP states a truism about the connection between the degree to which agents are mo-
tivated to do certain things and what, as a matter of fact, they do.17 However, the
objection considered above does not go through given this principle, since the fact that
an agent is most motivated to do something clearly does not imply that she most strongly
16It would instead be something the agent does unintentionally or non-intentionally. See Chan (1995)
for a proposed distinction between unintentional and non-intentional actions. It does not matter for
the argument here whether there is such a distinction, since it is suciently implausible that the agent
would necessarily watch The Wire either unintentionally or non-intentionally.
17Indeed, it may well be plausible to dene `motivation' such that SMP becomes a conceptual truth.
For discussion, see McCann (1995).
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intends it. To illustrate, an addict may have a stronger intention to resist her addiction,
and yet be more strongly motivated to sate her addition, which causes her to relapse. Of
course, things could happen otherwise: it may be that the addict in fact more strongly
{ perhaps because of some irrationality { intends to sate her addiction. The point here
is simply that it needn't be like this: sometimes, agents do otherwise than what they
most strongly intend to do. But something clearly causes them to act in the particular
way they do act, viz. their motivations. It is the possibility of the latter sort of cases {
failures to do what one most strongly intends to do, because one's motivations don't line
up with one's intentions { that militates in favor of keeping motivation and intention
separate in theorizing about agents' cognitive economies. Indeed, the literature on inten-
tion and motivation appears to reect this, for the claim that motivations and intentions
are distinct and separable mental states is a familiar and uncontroversial point.18
In sum, then, we should reject the principle connecting intention and intentional
action, viz. SIP, regardless of our acceptance of ISR. SIP is subject to clear and straight-
forward counterexamples, and its apparent plausibility is due to a confusion between the
degree of one's intention to perform an action and the degree to which one is motivated
to perform that action.
5. Remaining Asymmetries? First Pass: Full Belief and Full Intention
In the remaining three sections, we consider three nal objections to the Parity Account.
Rather than rejecting ISR, these objections grant the symmetry between rational belief
and rational intention, but argue that this symmetry does not eliminate the asymmetry
between epistemic and practical rationality. The rst objection claims that while BSR
and ISR establish a symmetry between rational degrees of belief and intention respec-
tively, there remains an asymmetry between full belief and full intention. The idea is
that if one has equally strong reasons for believing P and for believing a competing
proposition Q, it will always be irrational to fully believe P . By contrast, the objection
goes, if one has equally strong reasons for intending to  and for intending a competing
action  , it is not always irrational to fully intend to .
It is not clear to us that we should accept the objection's last claim, viz. that it
could be rational to fully intend something when one's reasons are equally strong for a
competing intention. Nevertheless, we grant that claim for the sake of the argument,
and more generally grant that there is an asymmetry between rational full belief and
18For one especially clear statement of this idea, see Bratman (1984, esp. pp 393 and following).
Even accounts of intention according to which intention partly comprises some motivational state, e.g.,
desire, do not simply identify the strength of intention with the strength of that state. See, for instance,
Sinhababu (2013). For an independent argument that such accounts should not identify the two, see
McCann (1995). Note that this response to the problem does not rely on any particular account of
what agential motivation amounts to, only on the claim that it should not be identied with agential
intention.
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rational full intention in this respect. However, we deny that this asymmetry amounts
to an asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality. Let us explain.
The Parity Account involves a commitment to the Gradability Thesis, according to
which belief and intention are both inherently gradable states. On this view, full beliefs
and full intentions are both wholly reducible to contextually-determined sets of degrees
of belief and intention, respectively. Put dierently, full beliefs and full intentions are
nothing over and above (contextually-determinde) sets of graded states. Accordingly,
there can be no normative principles governing such states over and above those that
govern the underlying graded states. Once we've xed the principles governing degrees
of belief and intention, there are simply no further demands of rationality to be found. It
follows that if there is symmetry in the rational demands on degrees of belief and intention
(which is what the current objection grants), there can be no remaining asymmetry
between the normative principles governing belief and intention, respectively.
How then would the alleged asymmetry between rational full belief and rational full
intention arise in the rst place? The answer must be that, for whatever reason, our
folk concepts of full belief and full intention refer to somewhat dierent sets of degrees
of belief and intention. For example, perhaps our folk concept of full belief tends to
refer to a relatively small interval of degrees of belief at the upper end of the belief-
spectrum, whereas our folk concept of full intention tends to refer to a somewhat larger
interval at the upper end of the intention-spectrum. While we doubt that there is any
such robust dierence between these two folk concepts, our point now is that such a
dierence in our folk concepts would have no bearing on the issue of whether there
is any asymmetry in the normative principles governing belief and intention. This is
because the underlying mental states { the states to which our folk concepts would refer
in their crude and contextually-determine manner { would still be governed by perfectly
symmetric normative principles, viz. BSR and ISR.
6. Remaining Asymmetries? Second Pass: Belief and Action
Let's turn then to a second objection alleging that there is a remaining asymmetry
between epistemic and practical rationality. This objection claims that since the view on
oer here grants that BSR is true and ASR is false, it still entails an asymmetry between
rational belief and rational action. Thus, the objection goes, the asymmetry between
epistemic and practical rationality has not been eliminated but instead merely relocated.
In response to this objection, note rst that although the Parity Account entails
an asymmetry between rational belief and rational action (in that BSR is true while
ASR is false), it entails precisely the same asymmetry between rational intention and
rational action (in that ISR is true while ASR is false). This latter asymmetry cannot
be explained by an asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality as such, since
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intentions and actions both fall within the domain of practical rationality. Indeed, there
is a plausible explanation of the asymmetry between rational belief and rational action
that applies equally to the asymmetry between rational intention and rational action.
This explanation begins by noting that actions are not the sort of things that can
be distributed among a set of mutually exclusive options in proportion to the strength
of one's reasons. One simply cannot perform one action to some (non-zero) extent
and simultaneously perform another, incompatible action to some (non-zero) extent.
By contrast, both beliefs and intentions can be distributed among mutually exclusive
options in this way, in that one can have a (non-zero) degree of belief in two incompatible
propositions P and Q and a (non-zero) degree of intention to perform two incompatible
courses of actions  and  .
This is important since Buridan's Ass, and other cases like it, are precisely the sorts
of cases in which it is rational to place a (non-zero) degree of belief and intention in two
incompatible options.19 In particular, we have argued that it is rational to place an equal
degree of belief and intention in each option in Buridan's Ass (and other cases in which
the reasons for two or more mutually exclusive options, be they epistemic or practical, are
equally strong). But there is simply no such thing as performing two mutually exclusive
actions to an equal (non-zero) degree. In Buridan's Ass, for example, the ass cannot
simultaneously go to both bundles of hay; and, furthermore, the ass cannot `split the
dierence' and somehow go to both bundles equally, i.e. to the same degree. In short,
the logic of action itself precludes any possibility of one's actions reecting the weight of
reasons in the way they can do with regard to belief and intention.
This fundamental dierence between the structure of belief and intention on the one
hand, and action on the other hand, by itself suggests that action will not be governed by
the same sorts of norms as belief and intention. So here we have at least the beginning of
an explanation of the fact that ASR is false while BSR and ISR are both true. But let's
push further. Given a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possible actions,
an agent cannot but perform exactly one of those actions, leaving all other possible
actions unperformed. As we have noted, it is also impossible for the agent to somehow
`split the dierence' with regard to action by performing two or more mutually exclusive
actions to an equal extent. Now, given the principle that it must be possible to do what
one is rationally required to do (i.e. that `rationally required' implies `can'), this entails
that an agent cannot be rationally required to achieve such an impossible feat.20 That
19As noted in x2, it would also be rational to lack any degree of intention or belief in either or both
options. In what follows, we focus on cases in which the agent does have some degree of intention or
belief in both of the relevant options.
20Indeed, note that the type of `splitting the dierence' between two incompatible actions that would
be required is not merely metaphysically impossible, but also conceptually impossible. After all, as
we've noted, action is just not the sort of thing that can be distributed or `split' into two or more equal
portions. Hence rejecting this entailment requires that one rejects the principle that rational agents can
only be required to do things that are conceptually possible.
15
is, it cannot be a requirement of rationality that an agent's action be equally distributed
among two incompatible options when reasons for each are equally strong in the way it
can be a requirement that her beliefs and intentions should be so distributed, as BSR
and ISR say they must.
Let's spell out the reasoning here by returning to Buridan's Ass. The ass can be
described as facing a choice between three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
possible actions, viz. going to the bundle on the left, going to the bundle on the right,
and going to neither bundle. Formally:21
(1) :Can[:Left ^ :Right ^ :Neither]
We now invoke the principle that `rationally required' implies `can':
(2) RR[] ! Can[]
From these, we can derive:
(3) :RR[:Left ^ :Right ^ :Neither]
In other words, it's not rationally required that [the ass not go left and not go right and
not go to neither]. By DeMorgan's law, we now get:
:RR:[Left _ Right _ Neither]
Now, `rationally required' and `rationally permitted' are interdenable. In particular,
if you're not rationally required to do something, then you're rationally permitted not
to do it. Thus we have (where `RP' stands for `rationally permitted,' and eliminating
negation):
(4) RP[Left _ Right _ Neither]
Rational permission distributes over disjunction, so that if you're rationally permitted
to do a disjunction of things, you're rationally permitted to do each of those things:
(5) RP[Left] _ RP[Right] _ RP[Neither]
Of course, it clearly would not be rational for the hungry ass to go to neither bundle,
i.e., :RP[Neither], since it would thus eventually starve to death. Assuming that these
actions exhaust the ass's options, this means that it must be rational for the ass to go
to one of the two bundles, i.e., RP[Left] _ RP[Right]. This suces to explain why ASR
is false in this case, implying as it does that the ass is not rationally permitted to go
Here, we appeal to the principle of `rationally required implies can' rather than the more familiar
`ought implies can' to avoid committing on issues about how general rational requirements, such as
those expressed by ASR, BSR, and ISR, are related to specic sorts of obligation. For more on this
issue, see Wedgwood (2013).
21In what follows, we're assuming a standard KD deontic logic.
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to either bundle. When it comes to belief and intention, by contrast, the ass has the
option of distributing its beliefs and intentions equally over the options available to it.
For this reason, there is no true analogue of premise (1) for either belief or intention. As
a consequence, BSR and ISR are not similarly ruled out by the principle that `rationally
required' implies `can'. Since the ass can distribute its beliefs and intentions equally
over options that are supported by equally strong reasons, the ass need not be rationally
permitted to discriminate in favor of one of these options in its beliefs and intentions.22
In sum, then, the explanation for the fact that ASR is false given that BSR and
ISR are both true is that since there is no such thing as performing two actions equally,
rationality cannot require that we do any such thing. By contrast, since both beliefs
and intentions can be equally distributed in the relevant sense, rationality may require
that we do so in some cases. Importantly, this explains the asymmetry between rational
action and rational belief not in terms of an asymmetry between epistemic and practical
rationality as such, but rather in terms of a dierence between the nature of beliefs and
actions, viz., that the former can be equally distributed whereas the latter cannot. Of
course, exactly the same dierence holds between the nature of intentions and actions,
which explains the corresponding asymmetry between rational intentions and rational
actions. Thus, this provides for a unied explanation of the two asymmetries between
rational actions and rational beliefs/intentions.
7. Remaining Asymmetries? Third Pass: Requirements of Rationality
Finally, we now turn to a third objection to the Parity Account on the basis of an alleged
remaining asymmetry between practical and epistemic rationality in Buridan's Ass-style
cases. Above we assumed that it would be irrational for the hungry ass to go to neither
of the two bundles. But what makes this course of action irrational? Presumably, this
should be explained in terms of some further requirement of rationality. Since that
requirement would then apply to something that is clearly in the domain of practical
rationality, viz. action, it seems we must accept a requirement of practical rationality
with no obvious parallel in the epistemic domain. Thus, the objection concludes, there
is an important structural dierence between practical and epistemic rationality after
all.23
Our response is to reject the idea that the requirement that explains the irrationality
of the ass's going to neither bundle is specic to practical rationality. As we noted above,
22Note that this explanation of the fact that ASR is false given that both BSR and ISR are true is not
meant to stand as an independent argument in favor of ISR (or, for that matter, BSR). Instead, it's only
meant to show that the proponent of ISR can explain away { by appeal, roughly, to the principle that
`rationally required' implies `can' { what might otherwise look like a remaining, puzzling asymmetry
between epistemic and practical rationality.
23We are very grateful to a reviewer for this journal for presenting us with a version of this worry and
for pressing us on this issue.
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the immediate practical reason why it would be irrational for the ass to go to neither
bundle is that it would starve to death, which is clearly worse for the ass than eating
either of the two bundles of hay. The requirement of (practical) rationality at work
here is thus simply that it's always irrational to perform an action  when it's possible
to perform a strictly better alternative action  , i.e. when one has stronger practical
reasons to  than to . This requirement, which mirrors familiar dominance principles
from decision theory, and which we may call the practical domination principle, is so
plausible that it may seem utterly trivial. However, note that nothing more is required
to explain the irrationality of the ass standing halfway between the two bundles without
going to either one, since just as going to either bundle constitutes a possible course
of action for the ass, so too does remaining motionless constitute a possible course of
action.
Now, although this practical domination principle is indeed a requirement of practical
rationality, there is an analogous requirement of epistemic rationality. Namely, that
it's always irrational to have an epistemic attitude D (to some proposition P ) when
it's possible to have a strictly better alternative attitude D* (to P ), i.e. when one
has stronger epistemic reasons to have D* than D (to P ). For example, if one has
strictly stronger epistemic reasons to have a credence of .7 rather than .6 in a proposition
P , then one should not have a .6 credence in P . Call this the epistemic domination
principle. Again, the principle is so plausible that it runs the risk of being considered
trivial, but its truth (together with that of the practical domination principle) shows
that there is no asymmetry between practical and epistemic rationality in the relevant
respect. Specically, the only requirement of practical rationality needed to explain the
irrationality of the ass's inactivity in Buridan's Ass-style cases is one that has a clear
analogue in the domain of epistemic rationality.24
One nal remark before concluding. Suppose one doesn't accept this line of argument,
and is still inclined to think that there is a sense in which something in the practical
domain, viz. action, is governed by a dierent kind of requirement than something in the
epistemic domain, viz. belief. What follows? We still do not think it follows that there
would be an asymmetry between epistemic and practical rationality per se. For, as we
discussed in the last section (x6), action is a very dierent kind of thing than belief. In
order to show that practical rationality and epistemic rationality per se were dierent,
one would need to point to similar kinds of things in each domain and show that these
very things were governed by dierent kinds of rational requirements.
An analogy might help make the point. Suppose in conversation a friend, Kim, claims
that the requirements of \sportsmanship" are asymmetric in, say, track and eld and
24It's worth noting that the two requirements invoked here { i.e. the practical and epistemic domi-
nation principles { can in turn be unied under a single generalized domination principle: It's always
irrational to choose an option X when it's possible to choose a strictly better alternative Y, i.e. when
one has stronger X/Y-relevant reasons to choose Y than X.
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in soccer. Suppose, as evidence for this claim, Kim points out that only in soccer is it
considered sportsmanlike to kick the ball out of bounds when a player of the opposing
team is injured, and that there's no corresponding conduct considered sportsmanlike to
be found in track and eld. This would clearly not be good evidence for Kim's claim
that the requirements of sportsmanship are asymmetric between the two sports. Why
not? Because, in the case of track and eld, there are no balls that can be kicked out
of bounds; so, it's not at all surprising that there is a dierence when it comes to what
sportsmanship in each domain amounts to. But this fact, that sportsmanship manifests
itself dierently in each domain depending on the materials it has to work on, doesn't
tell us anything about whether sportsmanship per se is fundamentally dierent in each
domain.
In our view, we nd ourselves in a similar situation with respect to action and belief.
We've just argued that, as a matter of fact, action and belief are governed by symmetri-
cal rational requirements in the case at issue, viz. the practical and epistemic dominance
principles. But even if one doesn't accept this argument, it's not sucient to under-
mine the symmetry between epistemic and practical rationality to point out that what
counts as rationality in action sometimes diers in interesting ways from what counts
as rationality in belief. As we saw in the last section, the two are structurally quite dif-
ferent kinds of things { for instance, one can be distributed between mutually exclusive
options, the other can't. One is soccer, the other track. What would undermine our
argument for symmetry in Buridan's Ass-style cases is evidence that there are structural
dierences between those requirements of practical and epistemic rationality that govern
corresponding or analogous phenomena within each domain. While we cannot rule out
that evidence of such structural dierences will eventually be found, we have not yet
seen anything that suggests such evidence will be forthcoming.
8. Conclusion
According to the Parity Account, the asymmetry between epistemic and practical ratio-
nality is only apparent. In the epistemic domain, a higher degree of belief in P than Q
rationally requires a stronger epistemic reason to believe P than to believe Q. Corre-
spondingly, in the practical domain, a higher degree of intention to  than  requires a
stronger practical reason to intend to  than intend to  . Since the analogue of belief
is not action but intention, this eliminates the apparent asymmetry between epistemic
and practical rationality.
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